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2135 (2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
The articles by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley,1 F. Scott Kieff,2 and 
R. Polk Wagner3 for the Symposium on the Foundations of Intellec-
tual Property Reform represent a very valuable collection of works 
from some of the most notable and influential patent scholars.  The 
wide range of claims and arguments—from Burk and Lemley’s vigor-
ous call for a return to the use of central claiming (and central-claim 
interpretation), to Wagner’s compelling demonstration that the in-
centives for patentees and the Patent Office to produce opaque patent 
disclosures with indeterminate claims are strong and probably very 
difficult to uproot, to Kieff’s forceful argument that patent-quality 
concerns are best resolved well after examination by imposing fee- 
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and cost-shifting penalties on patent owners that assert low-quality pa-
tents (and on infringers that ignore patents when validity cannot legiti-
mately be challenged)—provides an excellent sample of perspectives that 
helps to illuminate the broader scholarly debate about patents, patent 
quality, and patent-system reform.  Everyone with an interest in these 
issues will find these articles to be welcome and idea-stimulating reads. 
The task of responding in this format to three works so different 
in focus, viewpoint, and argument style presents something of a chal-
lenge.  Faced with some choices, like the linear presentation of three 
miniresponses (one to each work), I am inspired to attempt to organ-
ize this Response around some of the issues in the broader scholarly 
debate about patents, patent quality, and patent-system reform that I 
think are put into relief by the present works.  Given the limited 
amount of space available, and given that my approach requires pro-
viding some description of the claims and arguments of the various 
works in the context of the issues and future directions for work they 
raise, this Response will not include a synopsis of each work. 
As a final point, the structure of this Response bends somewhat 
the claims and arguments of the authors to my own will in service of 
the issues I desire to raise.  Integrating the works in this manner re-
quires some degree of generalization and categorization and creates 
the risk that I might in some way miscategorize an author’s point or 
argument.  It is not my intent to do so.  This Response is written with 
deep appreciation for the subject works, and I encourage the reader 
to perform her own thorough independent examination as a prescrip-
tion to any errors I might make. 
I.  ARE LOW-QUALITY PATENTS A PROBLEM WORTH THE CANDLE? 
Perhaps the most complete definition of patent quality is set forth 
in Professor Wagner’s Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms:  “Pa-
tent quality is the capacity of a granted patent to meet (or exceed) the 
statutory standards of patentability—most importantly, to be novel, 
nonobvious, and clearly and sufficiently described.”4  It goes on to ex-
plain that “low quality” patents are those “granted for an invention 
that do[] not meet these standards.”5 
The potential problem of low-quality patents is that they increase 
uncertainty in the patent system.  As Professor Wagner points out, un-
 
4 Id. at 2138. 
5 Id. 
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certainty about patentability and validity, uncertainty about the scope 
of granted patents, and, ultimately, uncertainty about whether the 
valuable enforcement of a patent is possible can make business deci-
sions involving patents difficult and costly.6 
To provide some additional context, consider the following de-
scription of the patent system and patent litigation.  By recent esti-
mates, there are roughly 1.8 million patents in force in the United 
States.7  It is commonly believed that only a tiny fraction of these pa-
tents have any economic significance whatsoever.  Of that tiny frac-
tion, only a fraction produce disputes between firms, and even fewer 
ever involve the filing of a complaint.  Of the rarified few that make it 
into a complaint (very roughly, 3000 in a given year8), only a fraction 
are the subject of a judicial decision on the merits (as a “high side” es-
timate, 0.2% of all issued patents9 or between 86 and 125 patents per 
year10); fewer still are appealed.  Finally, in those cases where an ap-
peal is taken and the appellate court is forced to render a decision, 
the trial court is affirmed over three-quarters of the time, which sug-
gests some amount of certainty and predictability.11 
If one assumes that not all patents that end up in a complaint are 
low-quality patents (or even if one assumes all such patents are low 
quality), it quickly becomes clear that in comparison to the overall 
number of in-force patents, the number of litigated low-quality patents 
is tiny.  That is not to say, of course, that low-quality patents can have 
no economic impact outside of litigation.  The uncertainty presented 
by low-quality patents may work to misallocate economic rewards even 
in the absence of litigation and, therefore, make less perfect the al-
ready imperfect incentive mechanism that is the patent system. 
 
6 Id. at 2140. 
7 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD PATENT REPORT:  A STATISTICAL 
REVIEW 23 (2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/ 
statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_pub_931.pdf (reporting the number of U.S. patents in 
force in 2006). 
8 See Posting by Dennis Crouch to Patently-O, Patent Litigation Statistics:  Number of 
Patents Being Litigated, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/03/patent-litigati.html 
(Mar. 17, 2008).  Professor Wagner reports that over roughly the last twenty years, 
there have been between approximately 1.4 and 2.4 patent-infringement suits filed per 
1000 in-force patents.  Wagner, supra note 3, at 2143 fig.1. 
9 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1501 & n.27 (2001). 
10 Id. at 1501 & n.26. 
11 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 17 & tbl.2 (2001) (reporting that the Federal Circuit affirmed 
seventy-eight percent of lower-court judgments on patent issues between 1983 and 1999). 
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I suspect that the professors, like many of those intimate with pa-
tents and the patent system, probably agree that it is better to have 
higher-quality patents than it is to have lower-quality ones.  I suspect al-
so, however, that many, including the professors, likely agree that there 
is a maximum patent quality that can be achieved, beyond which the 
pursuit of higher quality becomes inefficient.12  This leads to a central 
question in the scholarly debate concerning patents:  are low-quality pa-
tents a problem worth the candle?  There is little dispute that low-
quality patents exist to some extent.  But is it worth doing anything to 
try to reduce their number? 
The subject works of this Response can be read as providing three 
distinct answers to the question of whether low-quality patents are a 
problem worth doing anything about.  As I explain in more detail be-
low, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms suggests the answer is 
“yes.”  The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation suggests the an-
swer is “probably not,” while Fence Posts or Sign Posts? suggests more 
emphatically that the answer is “no.” 
Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms supports the argument for 
better patent quality by providing a compelling demonstration that 
the features defining low-quality patents are strongly encouraged by 
the facts of patent examination and litigation.  Using an analysis that 
is a mix of the empirical and the conceptual, Understanding Patent-
Quality Mechanisms thoroughly and dispassionately identifies and ex-
amines the incentives that patent applicants and the Patent Office 
have to draft and issue, respectively, large quantities of patents with 
opaque disclosures and indeterminate claims.13  It quite convincingly 
shows how strong and deeply entrenched these incentives are and 
how difficult it will be to adjust the incentives that give rise to low-
quality patents, at least in any substantial way, at a reasonable cost.14  
By so clearly undressing the incentive structure that gives rise to low-
quality patents, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms suggests, at 
least implicitly, that low-quality patents are very likely a significant sys-
temic problem, even when such patents are not litigated. 
The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation suggests the position 
that we need not be too concerned with low-quality patents because 
they are, generally speaking, without value; their assertion in litigation 
 
12 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 3, at 2139 (“Reaching a state of affairs where every 
granted patent meets or exceeds the standards of patentability seems both implausible 
and likely a misallocation of resources.”). 
13 Id. at 2145-58. 
14 Id. at 2163-65. 
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is a frivolous exercise.15  To the extent they harm the patent system, 
they do so because they make possible costly lawsuits that decrease the 
efficiency of the patent system’s incentive structure.  From this pers-
pective, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation considers wheth-
er administrative- or litigation-based decisionmaking reforms are 
more suitable for protecting the patent system.  The analysis finds 
administrative-based reforms badly wanting, chiefly because they do 
not adequately account for the transaction costs involved and because 
they do not adequately account for public-choice problems that have 
been amplified by recent decisions of the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit.16  The article finishes by arguing that the most pragmat-
ic solution to any putative low-quality-patent problem is found mostly in 
the general law of civil litigation,17 particularly in the rules associated 
with fee and cost shifting used to discourage frivolous lawsuits.18 
If The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation can be read as sug-
gesting that low-quality patents are probably not a problem worth the 
candle, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? can be read as suggesting much more 
emphatically that they are not.  Indeed, the latter seems to go farther, 
suggesting by its argument that there may be very few low-quality pa-
tents (by Professor Wagner’s definition); there is just low-quality law 
used to define the scope of the invention disclosed in a patent.  In 
other words, many patent applicants may make disclosures that clearly 
show patentable invention; the real problem is that the law of patent 
interpretation is so distorted that it has become incapable of accu-
rately locating the scope of the exclusive right.19 
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? appears to join this argument with one 
implied from the presentation of patent-system information earlier in 
this Response20 and expressly presented by Professor Lemley in his 
earlier, well-known piece Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, specifi-
cally:  “[S]o few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is 
much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in 
those few cases than to invest additional resources examining patents 
that will never be heard from again.”21 
 
15 Kieff, supra note 2. 
16 Id. at 1947-50, 1960-61. 
17 Kieff also advocates “dial[ing] down the presumption of validity.”  Id. at 1940. 
18 Id. at 1946, 1963. 
19 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1751-61 (describing the difficulties of claim-
construction under the current peripheral-claiming regime). 
20 See supra text accompanying notes 4-10. 
21 Lemley, supra note 9, at 1497. 
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Taken together, these arguments suggest that low-quality patents 
are almost no problem at all.  They are rarely litigated, and when they 
are, all courts have to do is properly locate the “core” or “gist” of the in-
vention and properly define the scope of the exclusive right from that 
understanding.  The problem of low-quality patents should largely fall 
away if such patents are assigned their proper scope—which I sense 
Professors Burk and Lemley believe will usually be narrower than the 
“improper” scope given by the current law. 
Although these works reveal some different conclusions about 
whether low-quality patents present a substantial problem, they also 
suggest some agreement on two important aspects of patent law and 
policy.  First, each work expresses a central idea about the current pa-
tent system:  that the incentive structure of the patent system can be 
made more efficient.  Professor Kieff finds that efficiency in the better 
application of the general law of civil litigation.  Professors Burk and 
Lemley find efficiency gains in changes to the way the patent law de-
fines the scope of a patentee’s exclusive right.  Professor Wagner sug-
gests efficiency gains may be best achieved by using many tools coope-
ratively, including administrative and patent law changes to diminish 
the incentives to defer clarity about claim scope in patent prosecution, 
changes in the patent law to weaken the presumption of validity, 
changes in the general law or in patent law to punish applicants who 
seek low-quality patents, and other incentives to diminish where poss-
ible the desire of patent applicants to seek large portfolios of low-
quality patents. 
Second, the works all suggest that the legislative proposals for pa-
tent reform that have been so ballyhooed over the last several years 
are not seriously directed to making any kind of real improvement to 
the patent system.  Each work suggests a patent reform (or reforms) 
not prominently featured in any of the main legislative proposals to 
reform the patent system.22  Indeed, the works expressly and implicitly 
criticize some of the main features of the legislative proposals that 
have been promoted for the last several years.23  Given the high quality 
 
22 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1746-48 (recommending central claiming); 
Kieff, supra note 2, at 1951-54 (advocating enhancing fee and cost shifting); Wagner, 
supra note 3, at 2166 (suggesting that “the USPTO . . . conduct much more thorough 
claim-construction analyses—-perhaps even drafting an administrative opinion on 
claim scope”). 
23 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 3, at 2163 (expressing skepticism that proposals 
such as “improving the administrative organization, altering the prosecution process, 
and abandoning the prosecution process . . . will make a substantial improvement in 
patent quality”). 
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of contributors, one can only question whether the legislative propos-
als that have been introduced have been crafted with the public’s in-
terest and benefit in mind. 
The works suggest a number of directions for future research.  
Most blatantly, while they provide very considered views on the ques-
tion, “Are low-quality patents a problem worth the candle?,” they do 
not show consensus, thereby suggesting that there is more to learn be-
fore this basic question can be answered.24 
In addition, two of the works, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity 
Litigation and Fence Posts or Sign Posts?, largely frame the measurement 
of patent-quality concerns from the perspective of litigation.  This is 
an analytically valid means to be sure, but the uncertainty presented 
by low-quality patents may work to misallocate rewards even in the ab-
sence of litigation.25  If this is a substantial problem in the patent sys-
tem, its extent is not well known.  Future work should seek to further 
examine and, if possible, quantify this problem. 
Finally, the prescriptions suggested by these works are novel and 
are deserving of follow-on work by others in the academy that have an 
interest in patent law, property, and patent-system reform.  If the pre-
scriptions bear the weight of additional scrutiny, serious efforts should 
be made to bring them to the attention of the policymakers responsi-
ble for drafting patent-reform legislation.  At a minimum, current and 
future patent-reform legislation should be better off with considera-
tion of the teachings of these works. 
II.  WHAT IS THE INVENTION THE PATENT SYSTEM PROTECTS? 
The subject works of this Response reveal two very different views 
about how a patent system might operationalize the exclusive rights 
that it promises.  The distinct views are most revealed by Fence Posts or 
Sign Posts?, the core argument of which is that the patent system 
should seriously consider moving to a central-claiming regime to de-
 
24 This is a question that has not, of course, gone unstudied.  A recent work by 
Boston University Law School professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer shines 
some light on the question, answering it at least in part in the affirmative.  See generally 
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:  HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (providing an empirically-based analysis 
of patent quality). 
25 It should also be pointed out that the prescriptions offered in these pieces 
should be expected to have a trickle-down effect on decisions to file both patent appli-
cations and patent lawsuits. 
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termine a patentee’s exclusive right, abandoning the current use of 
peripheral claims for that purpose.26 
As described by the authors, the main difference between the two 
approaches is that central claiming seeks to found patentee rights in 
the “gist” or “core” of the patentee’s inventive contribution.27  The 
“gist” or “core” of a patentee’s contribution is determined almost en-
tirely from reading the written-description portion of the patent doc-
ument.28  In central claiming’s basic form, any patents would at most 
contain only a single general claim that would be afforded little inter-
pretive force.29 
Peripheral claiming (conventionally used in many utility patents) 
is much less concerned with giving to a patentee the full scope of the 
“gist” or “core” of an invention’s contribution to society.  Instead, pe-
ripheral claiming seeks to tether a patentee’s exclusive right to the pa-
tentee’s specific contribution of embodiments of the invention that 
have real-world practicability.30  It measures the patentee’s contribu-
tion of such embodiments by the content of the patent document, re-
quiring a patentee, with words in the patent document, to particularly 
point out and distinctly claim the outer bounds (or “fence posts”) of a 
species, or more often of a genus, of nonobvious embodiments having 
specifically described and enabled characteristics.31  Thus, rather than 
 
26 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1747 (“Rather than relying on the illusion of 
peripheral fence posts, patent law may do better to once again look to central sign 
posts.”). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 1784. 
29 Id.  Fence Posts or Sign Posts? hedges its central claim by offering some interme-
diate steps between pure central claiming and peripheral claiming, in which claims 
may sometimes be permitted to play a greater interpretive role.  See id. at 1795-99.  In 
this short Response, I address only the article’s central claim. 
30 This is the natural consequence of peripheral claiming in the context of the 
enablement, written description, and other disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 
paras. 1-2 (2006).  See also Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 719, 721 (2009) (“Patent law has adopted a system of peripheral claiming, requir-
ing patentees to articulate their inventions’ bounds by the time of the patent grant, 
usually by listing their necessary and sufficient characteristics.  Peripheral claims in pa-
tent law are conventionally thought to give notice to the public of the extent of the set 
of protected embodiments so as to encourage efficient investment in innovation . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)).  That the embodiments delimited by peripheral claims are sup-
posed to have a nexus with real-world practicability is evident in the utility requirement 
of patent law, as well as in the subject matter requirement of patent law.  See, e.g., In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (requiring peripheral patent claims to de-
fine embodiments with specific real-world utility). 
31 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1749 (“The peripheral-claiming system seeks 
to define the outer boundaries of the invention.  In theory, the process works as fol-
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giving a patentee rights in the full scope of an inventive contribution, 
peripheral claiming is directed to giving a patentee something less. 
The arguments made in favor of central claiming in Fence Posts or 
Sign Posts? are manifold but can be somewhat generally dichotomized:  
First, the article provides an emphatic critique of the interpretation of 
peripheral claims.32  Second, the article favorably assesses the compar-
ative costs and benefits of central claiming using a description of its 
past and current use, and making predictions about the impact of im-
plementing central claiming in the United States.33 
As is normal with the writings of Professors Burk and Lemley, the 
arguments in Fence Posts or Sign Posts? are well written and forcefully 
presented.  But there are some reasons to be cautious in accepting the 
article’s conclusion hook, line, and sinker (a caution Fence Posts or Sign 
Posts? also emphasizes34).  Perhaps the most persuasive argument to 
read—the criticism of peripheral-claim interpretation—relies very 
heavily on descriptions and inferences from a set of patents that 
represent at most only the smallest sliver of in-force patents.35  Thus, 
however warranted the individual critiques are, it is less clear that the 
examples upon which they are based fully support the conclusion that 
there is a systemic problem.  The second part of the argument, parts 
of which I comment on below, is by its own terms more ambivalent 
about the merits of central claiming.36 
An initial question presented by Fence Posts or Sign Posts? is whether 
shifting patent-scope analysis from claims informed by written descrip-
tions to written descriptions alone presents much of a real difference 
in how patent scope is legally defined.  It is quite possible that it may 
not.  Words are, as Fence Posts or Sign Posts? vigorously argues, imper-
fect means for defining the scope of property rights.  As long as the 
patent system has to rely on the patent document to determine the 
scope of the right to exclude, however, getting rid of the words of pa-
 
lows:  The applicant and the PTO examiner negotiate over the scope of the invention, 
limiting it in view of the prior art and the range of examples that the applicant has 
enabled.”). 
32 See id. at 1748-65. 
33 See id. at 1765-95. 
34 See id. at 1747 (“Indeed, we are not ourselves fully persuaded that the benefits of 
central claiming outweigh the costs.”). 
35 See Lemley, supra note 9, at 1501 (noting that “less than two-tenths of one per-
cent of all issued patents actually go to court”).  Moreover, of those patent decisions 
that get appealed, over two-thirds are affirmed.  See Moore, supra note 11, at 11. 
36 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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tent claims does little more than substitute the words of other por-
tions of the patent document.37 
Patent attorneys already draft written descriptions with strategic 
goals in mind.  And even if patent attorneys are currently (because of 
claims, perhaps) less strategic in the words they use to draft descrip-
tions, they seem an irritable enough bunch to adapt their word-
selection strategies to that environment.  To tie in one of the other ar-
ticles, it seems likely that if the incentives of patent applicants are to 
make opaque disclosures with indeterminate descriptions of the spe-
cifics of an invention,38 patent applicants can do so equally well, if not 
better, in the absence of claims. 
Importantly, because the overall effect of claim derogation is to 
reduce the amount of information about the invention associated with 
the patent, claim derogation may have a deleterious effect on patent 
disclosures.  With claims, patent applicants can describe and enable 
exemplary embodiments with some clarity, being confident that they 
can use claims to define somewhat more abstractly the characteristics 
of those embodiments that they hope to include within their exclusive 
right.  Without claims, patent applicants may attempt to be much less 
clear in their disclosures for fear that specificity will narrow their 
rights to the point of uselessness. 
Another question presented by moving to a central-claiming re-
gime is what effect such a move will have on the incentive structure of 
the patent system.  At this point, whether it would have an overall ad-
verse impact or not is pure speculation.  Somewhat more specifically, 
however, there are reasons to be concerned that a move to central 
claiming might substantially adjust the system’s costs and benefits. 
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? contends that central claiming may reduce 
the cost of patent prosecution.39  This might be true, although there 
are reasons to think that the expectations might not be so clear.  To 
begin with, patent examiners rarely expressly construe claims,40 which 
suggests that there may not be much cost savings to be had by taking 
them out of patent applications.  In addition, claim amendments pro-
 
37 This argument assumes that the words of a patent claim are dominant.  This 
assumption might be questionable given the controlling case law of Phillips, which 
seems to be somewhat consonant with Fence Posts or Sign Posts?’s more intermediate po-
sitions.  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(emphasizing a holistic approach to patent-scope interpretation). 
38 See Wagner, supra note 3, at 2147-51. 
39 Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1786-87. 
40 See Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 198 (2006). 
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vide an outlet, a means of compromise, that permits allowance when 
patent applicants and examiners are locked in disagreement.  Without 
access to amendments, the ability to save costs by compromising is 
lost; examiners might allow patents they would have preferred not to 
for the benefit of a productivity credit; parties might be forced to file 
continuations and appeals for applications that clearly have patenta-
ble subject matter.  In short, if the patent system were to move to cen-
tral claiming, the costs of patent acquisition could decrease as Fence 
Posts or Sign Posts? suggests, but it is also possible that costs might in-
crease substantially. 
A nearly opposite cost concern is that the Patent Office might re-
spond to a central-claiming regime by allowing most applications to 
issue as patents; the theory is that, if necessary, courts will determine 
the accurate scope and separate the patentable from the unpatentable 
at a later time.  This registration-style approach to patent allowance 
could reduce the cost of patent prosecution (consonant with the ar-
gument of Fence Posts or Sign Posts?), but it could also encourage a tidal 
wave of patents.  Cheaper prosecution and greater uncertainty about 
the probability of the valuable enforcement of a patent might incen-
tivize parties to file even more patent applications than they do now.  
The onslaught of patents could increase even further the transaction 
costs of the patent system, which in turn could reduce the system’s 
ability to encourage innovation. 
Another systemic cost that might be affected is the cost of patent 
litigation.  Fence Posts or Sign Posts? acknowledges that one possible ex-
pectation of central claiming is an increase in patent litigation.41  
However, it suggests that the litigation that does result might be of a 
more desirable type and does not appear to contemplate a substantial 
and harmful increase in patent litigation.42  This prediction might be 
right, but if, for some of the reasons just suggested, central claiming 
produces many more patents and substantially more litigation, it 
could impose a substantial blow to the incentive structure of the pa-
tent system. 
Another cost that might be affected by a move to central claiming 
is framed nicely by Professor Wagner’s description of the patent sys-
tem in Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms.  A basic premise of the 
patent system is that “propertizing” inventions will “stimulate beha-
viors that will enable the market to better support innovation.”43  One 
 
41 Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1791. 
42 See id. at 1791-95. 
43 See Wagner, supra note 3, at 2140; cf. Kieff, supra note 2, at 1940-41 (expressing 
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way in which patents are believed to perform this role is by providing 
enough information about their attendant rights that parties can ne-
gotiate and transact around patents.44  As in the case of litigation, Fence 
Posts or Sign Posts? appears to make the concession that patents with 
claims that are interpreted provide modestly better ex ante informa-
tion about the legal scope of the patent rights than patents without 
claims.45  If this is so, a move to central claiming has the potential to 
disrupt—by making more costly—the organizing role that patents play 
in innovation. 
The dichotomy of claim interpretation presented in Fence Posts or 
Sign Posts? is fascinating, and its authors should be complimented for 
presenting it.  It also suggests a number of avenues for future work.  
For example, as Fence Posts or Sign Posts? observes, central claiming is 
still quite prominent in the U.S. patent system.46  Claims drafted in 
§ 112, paragraph 6 format are given a central-claim interpretation.  
Cases involving § 112, paragraph 6 central claims could be compared 
to cases involving more conventional peripheral claims to determine 
whether the analyses or outcomes of cases involving central claims are, 
in some way, better.  Future work might additionally examine the im-
pact of central claiming on the quality of disclosures, on other incen-
tives that are normally considered to attend the patent system, and on 
the cost of patent justice. 
III.  WHAT IS THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF PATENTS, AND SHOULD WE 
HAVE OUR CURRENT PATENT SYSTEM? 
What is the economic function of patents, and should we have our 
current patent system?  None of the works makes any real inroads on 
these seminal questions, which, while often unspoken, shape and in-
fluence much of patent scholarship.  To be fair, none of them tries 
expressly to do so.  But I do not think the inferences too attenuated to 
suggest that the works do reflect different beliefs about the answers to 
these questions. 
 
concern for “the ways that property rights in intangible assets can be structured so as to 
improve economic development, innovation, and competition by encouraging private 
actors to interact and strike deals with each other”). 
44 See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 68-
70 (4th ed. 2008). 
45 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1791. 
46 Id. at 1771-77. 
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As a preliminary matter, none of the works speaks in absolutes.  
All admit that the answers to these questions come in shades of gray, 
depending on both context and perspective.  None, I think, suggests 
that the patent system is perfectly efficient—in fact, all indicate the 
contrary—and none of the authors, I think, would argue that patents 
have never encouraged any innovative activity.  But I nonetheless 
think that the works reflect a divide over how the patent system works 
and how optimistic we should be over its potential. 
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? suggests that the patent system can really 
only be made to work where patent rights are determined very late in 
the game.  The dominant expectation appears to be costly litigation 
where the enforcement of any patent is subjected to a sensitive policy 
analysis through which an inventor’s adequate incentive is specifically, 
judicially crafted. 
The article also suggests a belief that business should be more in-
sulated from the effect of patents than it currently is because one in-
centive its reforms might promote is the incentive for competitors to 
take the risk of infringement, secure in the idea that courts will in-
terpret patents so as to avoid finding infringement.  And should they 
guess wrong, the most they should normally expect is for a court to 
move some money around the table in the future. 
In contrast to the highly customized patent justice reflected in 
Fence Posts or Sign Posts?, the other works appear to reflect the belief 
(or, at a minimum, the aspiration) that patent rights can be deter-
mined earlier in the game, without judicial assistance.  This view ac-
knowledges that expensive litigation will happen—that it is inevitable 
when the stakes are high enough—but it nonetheless expresses the 
expectation of a more generally predictable patent justice within 
which some litigation can be deterred and within which patents can be 
used to shape and support innovation with less judicial intervention. 
The divide in many respects reflects the ancient question of 
whether the patent system generally works to encourage innovation.  
If the view suggested by Fence Posts or Sign Posts?—that the patent sys-
tem can only be a predominantly ex post system, with incentive re-
wards based on unknowable rights and distributed typically by judges 
after expensive litigation—is correct, then the patent system might not 
work very well.  On the other hand, if the view suggested by Under-
standing Patent-Quality Mechanisms and by The Case for Preferring Patent-
Validity Litigation—that patents should and can be used by markets to 
efficiently encourage innovation—is correct, then the patent system 
may work reasonably well, and, in any event, improvement is possible. 
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The future directions for research in this area are clearly implied 
by the foregoing discussion. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, these works by Burk and Lemley, Kieff, and 
Wagner are illuminating and well written, and they provide an excel-
lent sample of perspectives on the broader scholarly debate about pa-
tents, patent quality, and patent-system reform.  And while I wish I 
had more room to discuss the issues and topics highlighted by these 
collected works, since I do not, I hope you will take the time to read 
them yourselves. 
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